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An analysis of the impact of fiscal policy on income distribution in Namibia 
Abstract 
 
This research analyses the statistical relationship between income distribution and seven taxation and 
government expenditure components in the Southern African country, Namibia, using data from 1996-
2016. The research is aimed at creating new knowledge on the research topic because no literature exists 
for Namibia on this. The Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) cointegration technique was 
employed to assess the long-run relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The 
research findings indicated that there is no long-run relationship between the dependent variable, 
income distribution, and the relevant independent variables. In the short-run, the research findings 
indicate that government expenditure on social pensions and government expenditure on education has 
a balancing or reducing effect on income distribution, while a tax on products, corporate income tax, 
and customs and excise duties have an unbalancing and/or worsening effect on income distribution. 
Based on these findings, tertiary education loans are recommended as opposed to grants to ensure the 
sustainability of the Namibia Students Financial Assistance Fund (NASFAF). In adjusting corporate 
and value-added taxes, the government is cautioned to avoid overburdening consumers and employees 
through tax shifting in the form of high prices of goods and services and low wages and benefits. A tax 
mix, tax discrimination, and a hybrid of taxation and government expenditure components are strongly 
recommended to achieve a balance and the sustainable development goal (SDG) of reduced income 
inequality. 
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This section presents an outline of the fiscal policy and the current state of income distribution in 
Namibia. Before proceeding, the global perspective is painted.   Income inequality is a global challenge 
that affects all countries in the world. However, the degree of inequality differs from country to country 
and continent to continent. Various researchers and scholars indicate that the world income is unequally 
distributed and that this inequality occurs within countries, between countries, and between continents.  
Kuznets (1980) indicates that the three underdeveloped continents of the world, namely Latin America, 
Africa, and Asia, account for more than 60 per cent of the world’s population but account for less than 
30 per cent of the world’s income. Table 1 below depicts the distribution of income according to 
different household quantiles. 
 
Table 1: Income distribution of selected countries 
Households 
(quantile) 
Percentage of total income 
Brazil and South Africa United States Finland and Sweden  
Lowest 2 5 8 
Second 5 11 14 
Third 10 16 20 
Fourth 18 24 23 
Highest  65 44 35 
Source: Parkin (2016) 
 
According to the African Development Bank Group (2017), Africa has the highest income inequality 
in the world with an average Gini index value of 43, while Europe has the lowest income inequality. At 
the country level, South Africa, Colombia, Namibia, Botswana, Brazil, Honduras, and Chile are among 
countries with the highest income inequalities in the world, with an average Gini index value above 50. 
Countries with the Gini index value of 30 and above but less than 50 are considered as medium Gini 
coefficient countries. These countries include Russia, Vietnam, Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay, Poland, 
and the United States. Countries with a Gini coefficient below 30 are considered as low Gini index 
countries, and these countries include Norway, Denmark, Austria, Slovenia, Germany, Sweden, and 
Ukraine, among others. The causes of income inequalities differ from continent to continent and country 
to country.   
 
When the first democratically elected government took over on 21 March 1990, Namibia was faced 
with several challenges such as a much-skewed distribution of income (with the Gini coefficient greater 
than 70), a low level of education and a large element of unskilled labour. Education and training are 
some of the determinants of income inequality. It is worth noting that income inequality has reduced 










Figure 1 Gini coefficient trend 
 
Source:  Authors depiction using data from Namibia Statistics Agency  
 
From independence in 1990, some income redistribution initiatives and policies were put in place to 
redress the wrongdoings of the former colonial apartheid government. These policies and initiatives 
include the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), the Affirmative Action Act, the National poverty 
reduction strategy, the Zero Hunger challenge, etc. These policies and initiatives are incorporated in the 
national development planning (NDP) agenda of the government (National Planning Commission). The 
government objectives and plans are strategically implemented and cascade from Vision 2030 to the 
NDP’s strategic, annual, and quarterly plans to individual quarterly and monthly plans.  
 
From data (Ministry of Finance website), it can be observed that government expenditure on education 
and health has more than tripled over the past 14 years and this can be attributed to the growing 
population, which leads to an increased demand for government education and health services. Statistics 
indicate that taxes, customs, and excise duties are the main source of the Namibian government revenue, 
contributing more than 95 per cent of government revenue. Government expenditure on social pensions 
has more than doubled over the past six years due to some factors, of which the main one is highlighted. 
Firstly, the sharp increase in government expenditure on social pensions is due to an increase in the 
proportion of the population that is receiving social pensions. Secondly, the sharp increment can be 
attributed to an 83.33 per cent increment in the old age pension in 2015.  In general, the government 
has made some strides in reducing income inequality as indicated by the declining Gini coefficient 




2 Literature review 
 
This section presents the empirical literature review of the work by various researchers and scholars 
whose empirical research has relevance to the analysis of the impact of taxation and government 
expenditure components on income inequality in Namibia. The empirical literature is demarcated 
according to the method of study.  This section is designed to provide an in-depth understanding of the 
research topic from the empirical analysis point of view and to provide the empirical foundation/footing 
of this research.   
 
Various scholars and researchers have analysed the impact of taxation and government expenditure 
components on income distribution, with most of the empirical findings indicating that taxation and 
government expenditure components are statistically significant in influencing income inequality in 
general. Leu, et al. (2009) researched to analyse the impact of government policies on income 
distribution in Switzerland using the Budget incidence approach. In conducting their investigation, Leu, 
et al. (2009) used data from the first nationwide representative Income and Wealth Survey. The findings 
of their research indicate that government expenditures are more effective in redistributing national 
income as opposed to direct taxes. Social welfare expenditures were found to be more effective in 
redistributing national income as opposed to other government expenditures. Their research further 
indicates that indirect taxes have an unbalancing effect on the distribution of income.  
 
Regarding government expenditure on education, Tsanos and Manos (1999) conducted empirical 
research on the distributional impact of government education expenditure in Greece using micro-data 
of the 1987/88 Greek Household Budget Survey which was conducted by the National Statistical 
Service of Greece. Tsanos and Manos (1999) segmented the education component into three segments, 
namely, primary, secondary and tertiary education. Secondary education was further segmented into 
lower-secondary education and upper-secondary education while tertiary education was further 
segmented into higher education institutions and technical education institutions. Tsanos and Manos 
(1999) employed hedonic regression techniques to estimate their model. The research findings indicate 
that government expenditure on primary and secondary education is undoubtedly significant in reducing 
inequality on aggregate. Education expenditure on tertiary education was found to have an 
unbalancing/regressive effect on inequality.  
 
The effects of education expenditure on income inequality have been researched widely by various 
researchers, and most of the findings undoubtedly indicate a balancing effect on income inequality. 
Sylwester (2002) researched the effects of government expenditure on education on income inequality 
using cross-sectional data of a selected number of countries. In analysing the effects of government 
expenditure, Sylwester (2002) used the Gini coefficient as a proxy for income inequality and the 
empirical research findings indicate that countries whose governments devote more financial resources 
to education as a percentage of GDP experienced lower income inequality in subsequent years. In 
conducting the research, Sylwester (2002) employed the least square regression method and White’s 
correction for heteroscedasticity. The findings of the research undoubtedly indicate that government 
expenditure on education has a balancing effect on income inequality in both developed and developing 
countries. Sylwester (2002) concluded that allocating more government resources to the education 
sector will lead to a reduction in income inequality.  
 
Another research conducted by Vaalavuo (2013) indicated that social expenditure by the government 
has a balancing effect on income inequality. Vaalavuo (2013) conducted empirical research on the re-
distributional impact of traditional and modern/new social expenditure by the governments of six 
selected European countries, namely, France, the Netherlands, Slovenia, United Kingdom, Spain, and 
Denmark. The research employed the imputation method as an estimation tool.  The findings of the 
empirical research by Vaalavuo (2013) indicate that traditional social expenditure by government, e.g. 
old age cash benefits or social pensions, is effective in reducing income inequality because it is directed 
towards the bottom income quintiles as opposed to the new social expenditure methods. The research 
findings further indicate that the inclusion of government services in the model further reduces income 
inequality.  
 
The existing theories of taxation suggest that taxation is very effective in reducing income inequality 
and that labour taxes are effective in reducing income inequality, as opposed to consumption taxes. This 
theory is supported by the empirical research findings of Mylonidis and Losifidi (2017), in which they 
analysed the redistributive effects of taxation using a panel of 17 Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries over 31 years. In conducting their research, they 
employed the two-stage least squares estimation method. The findings of the research by Mylonidis and 
Losifidi (2017) indicate that direct taxes such as progressive income taxes/labour taxes are effective in 
reducing income inequality, as opposed to consumption taxes such as value-added tax or general sales 
tax. In conducting their empirical research, Mylonidis and Losifidi (2017) identified and analysed tax 
rates that are comparative among across the selected OECD countries with the view to levelling the 
playing field. The primary focus of their research was to analyse how a change in the combination of 
different tax rates, namely, labour, consumption, and capital taxes affect inequality in OECD countries. 
Concerning the change in the tax mix, the research findings indicate that an increase in the tax burden 
on labour relative to capital leads to an increase in income inequality. Increasing the tax burden on 
consumption relative to capital was also found to have an unbalancing effect on income inequality. The 
research findings further indicate that income equality improves with an increase in the tax burden on 
labour relative to consumption. The research findings indicate that the distributive power of labour taxes 
is very significant in reducing income inequality.  The research findings of Mylonidis and Losifidi 
(2017) indicate that a tax mix is more effective in reducing inequality and poverty as opposed to one 
specific tax in general. On that basis, Mylonidis and Losifidi (2017) recommend a tax mix as an 
effective income redistribution measure as opposed to one specific tax.   The research findings also 
reveal that the gap between the poor and the rich has widened over the past three decades in OECD 
countries.   
 
Researchers and scholars have generally accepted that the gap between the poor and the rich has 
increased over the past decades.  Research by Wittenberg (2017) on the wages and wage inequality in 
South Africa substantiated this claim.  Wittenberg (2017) used 1994-2011 data from October Household 
Surveys and Quarterly Labour Force Surveys. To deal with measurement issues such as outliers, bracket 
data, and missing values, Wittenberg (2017) used three procedures, namely, the BACON algorithm for 
outlier detection, extreme stundentised regression residuals and robust regression. These procedures 
ensure data quality and reliability of the results. Wittenberg (2017) pointed out that it is not 
possible/sufficient to read wage trends from raw data without applying various data adjustment 
methods. Data quality adjustment approaches considered by Wittenberg (2017) include the mid-point 
imputation, reweighting, multiple imputations, hot deck, point and mean imputation approach. The 
empirical research findings of Wittenberg (2017) indicate that inequality in earnings among employees 
in South Africa has increased between 1994 and 2011. Considering that the labour markets of South 
Africa and Namibia are closely intertwined, the same assumption can be made for Namibia. However, 
empirical research will be required to substantiate this statement.  
 
Most economists and researchers generally accept the effectiveness of taxation and government 
expenditure policies in reducing income inequality. Martinez-Vasquez, Moreno-Dodson, and Vulovic 
(2012) cement this notion with the research findings on ‘the impact of Taxation and Expenditure 
policies on income distribution’. Martinez-Vasquez., et al. (2012) indicate that taxation policy is 
statistically significant in reducing income inequality. In conducting their analysis, Martinez-Vasquez., 
et al. (2012) employed the generalised method of moments approach (GMM) which is considered 
appropriate for research of that nature.  The research conducted by Martinez-Vasquez., et al. (2012) 
indicates that taxes and government expenditure have a significant effect on income distribution. The 
research is based on data from a sample of 150 countries over 36 years from 1970-2006. Martinez-
Vasquez., et al. (2012) indicate that when progressive income taxes are considered separately, they tend 
to have a balancing/improvement effect on income inequality, leading to decrease inequality. The 
research further indicates that general consumption taxes (e.g. tax on products), excise, and customs 
duties have an unbalancing effect on the distribution of income. On the expenditure side, the research 
findings indicate that large proportions of GDP on social welfare activities, education services, health 
services have a balancing/improvement effect on the distribution of income, both individually and 
collectively. It should however be noted that different countries may have different empirical results for 
similar variables because each country has different economic and environmental factors that may 
influence the relevance of each variable.  
 
3 Methodology and empirical results 
 
The ARDL bounds test approach to cointegration was employed for this study. The dependent variable 
for this research is the Gini coefficient (G), which is the proxy/measure of income inequality. On the 
taxation side, the independent variables for this thesis are a tax on income and wealth (TIW), tax on 
products (TP), corporate income tax (CIT) and customs and excise duty from SACU (CE). On the 
expenditure side, the independent variables are government expenditure on social pensions (GESP), 
government expenditure on education (GEE), and government expenditure on health (GEH). The 
research employed the linear log regression model as used by Manning and Mullahy (2001). This 
research is a modified version of empirical research conducted by Leu, et al. (2009), titled “Taxes, 
expenditures and income distribution in Switzerland”. In their research, Leu, et al. (2009), analysed the 
impact of government policies on income distribution and poverty in Switzerland. In conducting their 
investigation, Leu, et al. (2009), used mainly data from the first countrywide representative Income and 
Wealth Survey. The findings of their research indicate that government expenditures are more effective 
in redistributing national income as opposed to direct taxes. Social welfare expenditures were found to 
be more effective in redistributing national income as opposed to other government expenditures. Their 
research further indicates that indirect taxes have an unbalancing effect on the distribution of income. 
This research is modified to focus specifically on the impact of taxation and expenditure components 
on income distribution in Namibia. The empirical model that was used in undertaking this research is 
specified in a functional form as follows: 
G = f (GESP, GEE, GEH, TP, TIW, CE, CIT)           (1) 
Equation (4.1) above is expressed in an econometrics equation as specified below:  
Get =β0 +β1GESPt + β2GEEt+β3GEHt + β4TPt+β5TIWt + β6CEt +β7CITt + ℇ t (2)  
Where:  
G  =  Gini coefficient 
GESP  =  Government Expenditure on Social Pensions  
GEE  =  Government Expenditure on Education 
GEH =  Government Expenditure on Health 
TP  =  Tax on Products/VAT 
TIW =  Tax on Income and Wealth 
CE  =  Customs and Excise duties from SACU  
CIT =  Corporate Income Tax 
ℇ  =  Stochastic error term  
β’s       =  Coefficients  
t       =  Time/period  
β1 to β7 represents the coefficients of the independent variables and they determine how much the 
independent variables affect the dependent variable in this research. Time series data is considered to 
be affected by heteroscedasticity if the variance of the error term of an OLS is not constant. In the 
presence of heteroscedasticity in the time series, the standard error becomes biased, thereby affecting 
the confidence interval and the test statistics. Berry and Feldman (1985) indicate that minor 
heteroscedasticity may have little effect on significance tests. However, enormous heteroscedasticity 
can lead to a serious misrepresentation of the research findings, thereby compromising the analysis and 
increasing the possibility of a Type I error. Manning and Mullahy (2001) indicate that transforming an 
equation into a natural log can reduce heteroscedasticity, and therefore equation three (4.3) is converted 
into a natural log as formulated below with the prime purpose of reducing heteroscedasticity. This 
method helps to estimate the variables in the same form and makes the interpretation of the results easy 
and simple. The natural log equation is specified as follows:  
lnGt = β0 + β1lnGESPt + β2lnGEEt + β3lnGEHt + β4lnTPt + β5lnTIWt + β6lnCEt + β7lnCITt + ℇ t    
         (3)  
 
The Ordinary Least Squares method alone would not yield the desired results; therefore, the research 
employed appropriate techniques to test the stationarity property of the variables in the model. The DF-
GLS and the Phillips-Perron (1988) unit root tests are employed to test the stationarity property of the 
variables in equation 4.3 above. The research used the ARDL approach to estimate the parameters in 
equation 4.3 above. The research also employed the bound test to test for cointegration and the Wald 
test to test for the significance of the variables. The research employed the Breusch-Godfrey serial 
correlation LM test, the Jarque-Bera normality test, the Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
test (ARCH test, and the normality test to assess the robustness of the model. The Granger causality test 
was also conducted to establish the causal relationship between the Gini coefficient and its explanatory 
variables.  
 
The variable to the left-hand side of the equation (G) is the dependent variable while the variables on 
the right-hand side of the equation (GESP, GEE, GEH, CE, TP, TIW, and CIT) are the independent 
variables. The stochastic error term (ℇ t) on the equation above represents the effects of the variables 
that were omitted from the equation, which are assumed to have a mean value of zero and to be 
uncorrelated to the independent variables.  
 
This research used a quantitative research method using the dataset which comprises 21 data points at 
a yearly frequency for all the variables. Data extrapolation was conducted by transforming annual 
frequencies to quarterly frequencies in E-views.  Secondary data was obtained and analysed to create 
new knowledge on the research topic. Data for tax on income and wealth, tax on products, and tax on 
corporations was collected from NSA, National Accounts. Data on government expenditure on social 
pensions were obtained from various publications of the Bank of Namibia (Research Department), 
Ministry of Finance (MoF), Ministry of Poverty Eradication and Social Welfare and Ministry of Labour 
and Industrial Relations. To have a complete set of data for the desired time series, some data were 
collected from the United Nations (United Nations Development Programme).  Data for the Gini 
coefficient was obtained from NSA (Namibia Household Income and Expenditure Surveys) while data 
for customs and excise duty was obtained from SACU annual reports. Data for government expenditure 
on education and health was obtained from the Bank of Namibia, Ministry of Education, and Ministry 
of Health.  
3.1 Stationarity test results 
The Dickey-Fuller Generalised Least Squares (DF-GLS) and the Phillips-Perron Tests were employed 
to test the stationarity property of the variables, firstly, at the level and secondly, at first difference.  We 
fail to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the data sets are non-stationary at a level. The DF-
GLS and the Phillips-Perron stationarity test results jointly indicate that the variables are stationary after 
first differencing. In the next section, the cointegration test is conducted to determine if there is a long-
run relationship between the dependent and independent variables.   
3.2 ARDL model estimation and cointegration test results  
The next step is to estimate the standard ARDL model from which we can derive the long-run equation 
to establish the long-run relationship between the Gini coefficient and the selected explanatory 
variables. For this research, we employed the ARDL Bounds test approach to establish the long-run 
relationship between the variables. If the cointegration test results indicate that the variables are 
cointegrated, the ECM will be estimated to establish the short-term dynamics. The ARDL in-
built/automatic lag selection criteria were employed to select the optimal number of lags for each 
variable. The optimal lags for the ARDL model are (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1). Table 3 below shows the 
results of the ARDL model.  
 
Table 3: ARDL Model 
Dependent Variable: LN_G 
Method: ARDL 
Date: 05/14/19   Time: 17:13 
Sample (adjusted): 1996Q2 2016Q4 
Included observations: 83 after adjustments 
Maximum dependent lags: 4 (Automatic selection) 
Model selection method: Akaike info criterion (AIC) 
Dynamic regressors (4 lags, automatic): LN_GESP LN_GEE LN_GEH LN_TIW LN_TP LN_CE 
LN_CIT   
Fixed regressors: C 
Number of models evaluated: 312500 
Selected Model: ARDL(1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.* 
C1 LN_G(-1) 0.889481 0.048878 18.19792 0.0000 
C2 LN_GESP -0.131894 0.021309 -6.189532 0.0000 
C3 LN_GESP(-1) 0.105944 0.022771 4.652634 0.0000 
C4 LN_GEE -0.166086 0.039079 -4.250015 0.0001 
C5 LN_GEE(-1) 0.145905 0.035550 4.104216 0.0001 
C6 LN_GEH 0.014511 0.012155 1.193769 0.2367 
C7 LN_TIW -0.049179 0.023922 -2.055767 0.0436 
C8 LN_TP 0.146049 0.027267 5.356175 0.0000 
C9 LN_TP(-1) -0.121935 0.026709 -4.565376 0.0000 
C10 LN_CE 0.044029 0.016201 2.717755 0.0083 
C11 LN_CE(-1) -0.030385 0.016456 -1.846393 0.0691 
C12 LN_CIT 0.115921 0.021942 5.282986 0.0000 
C13 LN_CIT(-1) -0.076091 0.016348 -4.654494 0.0000 
C14 C 0.477109 0.231581 2.060221 0.0432 
R-squared 0.983482     Mean dependent var 4.138346 
Adjusted R-squared 0.980370     S.D. dependent var 0.080552 
S.E. of regression 0.011286     Akaike info criterion -5.977882 
Sum squared resid 0.008789     Schwarz criterion -5.569885 
Log-likelihood 262.0821     Hannan-Quinn criteria. -5.813972 
F-statistic 316.0146     Durbin-Watson stat 2.076120 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Source: Authors compilation from Eviews output 
 
The Wald test for coefficient significance is employed to test for the significance of the coefficients in 
the ARDL model above. The null and alternative hypotheses for the Wald test for coefficient 
significance are given below:  
𝐻0: Coefficients = 0 
𝐻1: Coefficients ≠ 0 
We reject the null hypothesis if the p-value of the F-statistic is less than or equal to 0.05. The test is 
conducted in two categories, the first category consists of coefficients with a value less than 0.05 while 
the second category consists of coefficients with the p-value greater than 0.05 level of significance.  The 
Wald test results are given in table 4 and 5 below:  
 
Table 4: Wald test results for significant coefficients 
Wald Test: 
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
Wald Test: 
F-statistic  101.3089 (11, 69)  0.0000 
Chi-square  1114.398  11  0.0000 
Null Hypothesis: C(1)=0, C(2)=0, C(3)=0, C(4)=0, C(5)=0, C(7)=0, C(8)=0, C(9)=0, C(10)=0, 
C(12)=0, C(13)=0 
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
C(1)  0.889481  0.048878 
C(2) -0.131894  0.021309 
C(3)  0.105944  0.022771 
C(4) -0.166086  0.039079 
C(5)  0.145905  0.035550 
C(7) -0.049179  0.023922 
C(8)  0.146049  0.027267 
C(9) -0.121935  0.026709 
C(10)  0.044029  0.016201 
C(12)  0.115921  0.021942 
C(13) -0.076091  0.016348 
Source: Authors compilation from Eviews output 
 
Table 5: Wald test results for redundant variables 
Wald Test: 
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
F-statistic  2.171887 (2, 69)  0.1217 
Chi-square  4.343774  2  0.1140 
Null Hypothesis: C(6)=0, C(11)=0  
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
C(6)  0.014511  0.012155 
C(11) -0.030385  0.016456 
Source: Authors compilation from Eviews output 
 
The Wald test results above confirm that C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C7, C8, C9, C10, C12 and C13 are jointly 
statistically significant at 5 per cent level of significance while C6 and C11 are statistically insignificant 
or redundant variables. Based on the Akaike Information Criteria graph of the top 20 models above, we 
can observe that the selected model is superior compared to other models on the top 20 list. Using the 
results of the ARDL model in table 3 above, we can derive the long-run equation from the ARDL 
bounds testing through a simple linear transformation.  The long-run equation is presented in table 6 
below:  
 
Table 6: Long run levels equation 
Long Run Coefficients 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
LN_GESP -0.234804 0.119593 -1.963363 0.0536 
LN_GEE -0.182609 0.208150 -0.877295 0.3834 
LN_GEH 0.131297 0.124376 1.055645 0.2948 
LN_TIW -0.444983 0.241550 -1.842200 0.0697 
LN_TP 0.218184 0.195401 1.116600 0.2680 
LN_CE 0.123456 0.105027 1.175465 0.2438 
LN_CIT 0.360395 0.188926 1.907603 0.0606 
C 4.316989 0.716023 6.029125 0.0000 
Long Run Coefficients 
Cointeq/ECT = LN_G - (-0.2348*LN_GESP  -0.1826*LN_GEE + 0.1313*LN_GEH -
0.4450*LN_TIW + 0.2182*LN_TP + 0.1235*LN_CE + 0.3604*LN_CIT + 4.3170 ) 
CointEq(-1) -0.101450 0.032098 -3.160652 0.0023 
Source: Author’s compilation from Eviews output 
 
The P-values associated with the long-run coefficients are all insignificant at a 5 per cent level of 
significance, therefore, we can conclude that there is no cointegration. To confirm the p-values of the 
long-run results above, we can conduct the ARDL bounds test. The bounds test results are presented in 
Table 7 below:  
 
Table 7: F-Bounds test results 
ARDL Bounds Test 
Null Hypothesis: No long-run relationships exist 
Test Statistic Value k 
F-statistic  1.046439 7 
Critical Value Bounds 
Significance I(0) Bound I(1) Bound 
10% 1.92 2.89 
5% 2.17 3.21 
2.5% 2.43 3.51 
1% 2.73 3.9 
Source: Authors compilation from Eviews output 
 
The cointegration test results above confirm that all the variables do not have long-run relationships at 
5 per cent level of significance, therefore, we cannot specify an error correction model.  
3.3 ARDL short-run model and causality test   
The next step is to estimate the parsimonious ARDL model with differenced variables and conduct the 
short-run granger causality based on the t-statistics and the Wald F-test. Five control variables, namely, 
GDP growth, population growth, inflation, corruption perception index, and the unemployment rate 
were included in the model, however, desired results could not be obtained. The automatic/build-in lag 
selection criteria were employed to select the optimal number of lags for each variable in the model. 





Table 8: ARDL model with differenced variables 
Dependent Variable: D(LN_G) 
Method: ARDL 
Maximum dependent lags: 4 (Automatic selection) 
 
Model selection method: Akaike info criterion (AIC) 
Dynamic regressors (4 lags, automatic): D(LN_GESP) D(LN_GEE) D(LN_GEH) D(LN_TIW) 
D(LN_TP) D(LN_CE) D(LN_CIT) 
Fixed regressors: C 
Number of models evaluated: 312500 
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.*   
D(LN_G(-1)) -0.005016 0.063385 -0.079139 0.9372 
D(LN_G(-2)) -0.005016 0.063385 -0.079139 0.9372 
D(LN_G(-3)) -0.005016 0.063385 -0.079139 0.9372 
D(LN_G(-4)) 0.427349*** 0.089109 4.795818 0.0000 
D(LN_GESP) -0.139709*** 0.018818 -7.424107 0.0000 
D(LN_GEE) -0.146113*** 0.044489 -3.284236 0.0016 
D(LN_GEH) -0.022352 0.024483 -0.912957 0.3645 
D(LN_TIW) -0.061108 0.046679 -1.309111 0.1950 
D(LN_TP) 0.232441*** 0.031974 7.269658 0.0000 
D(LN_CE) 0.044395*** 0.015637 2.839141 0.0060 
D(LN_CIT) 0.119209*** 0.028737 4.148300 0.0001 
C -0.000601 0.001373 -0.437300 0.6633 
R-squared 0.733304     Mean dependent var -0.002843 
Adjusted R-squared 0.689518     S.D. dependent var 0.018345 
S.E. of regression 0.010222     Akaike info criterion -6.189477 
Sum squared resid 0.007001     Schwarz criterion -5.829560 
Log-likelihood 256.4843     Hannan-Quinn criteria. -6.045283 
F-statistic 16.74746     Durbin-Watson stat 1.997336 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Source: Authors compilation from Eviews output 




The short-run estimates in the table above reveal that Government expenditure on social pensions 
(GESP), government expenditure on education (GEE), tax on products (TP), corporate income tax (CIT) 
and customs and excise duties from SACU are statistically significant at 1 per cent level of significance 
in the short-run. Government expenditure on health (GEH) and tax on income and wealth were found 
to be statistically insignificant. The research findings reveal that government expenditure on social 
pensions has a reducing effect on the Gini coefficient, and it is statistically significant at 1 per cent with 
the P-Value of 0.0000. The coefficient of government expenditure on social pensions is -0.1397, which 
implies that a 1 per cent increase in government expenditure on social pensions will lead to an 
improvement in the income distribution of 0.13 per cent, ceteris paribus. This is in line with the 
economic theory which stipulates that social transfers promote a fair distribution of income since it 
targets vulnerable members of society and boosts the purchasing power of people in the low-income 
category such as elderly people, physically and mentally challenged individuals, as well as orphans in 
the case of Namibia. Samuelson (1955) indicates that all redistributions take place through transfer 
expenditure. Several research findings have also indicated that social transfers have a positive impact 
on income distribution, e.g. the findings of empirical research conducted by Vaalavuo (2013) indicate 
that government expenditure on social welfare such as cash benefit/social pensions has a balancing 
effect on income distribution. Keynes (1936) also insists on the need for the government to intervene 
to correct market failures such as income inequality, through various interventions which include the 
provision of social pensions.  
 
The coefficient of government expenditure on education is negative and significant. The P-value of 
government expenditure on education is 0.0016 and its coefficient is  
-0.14611, which implies that a 1 per cent increase in government expenditure on education will lead to 
a reduction in the Gini coefficient by 0.15 per cent, ceteris paribus. These results conform to economic 
theory, which suggests that government expenditure on education has a positive impact on income 
distribution as measured by the Gini coefficient. Samuelson (1955) highlighted the benefits and 
distributional effects of government expenditure on education. These results confirm the findings of the 
research conducted by Sylwester (2002) and Tsanos and Manos (1999), whose empirical research 
findings indicate that government expenditure on education has a balancing effect on income inequality. 
Another research by Martinez-Vasquez., et al. (2012) indicates that government expenditure on social 
welfare activities such as education services reduces income inequality. 
 
Tax on products has a worsening effect on the Gini coefficient. The worsening effect is indicated by 
the coefficient of tax on products, which is positive and significant at 1 per cent level of significance. 
Its P-value is 0.0000 while its coefficient is 0.2324 which implies that an increase in tax on products by 
1 per cent will lead to an increase in Gini coefficient by 0.23 per cent, ceteris paribus/holding all other 
variables constant. The findings of empirical research by Leu, et al., (2009) indicate that taxes have an 
unbalancing/regressive effect on income distribution.  These findings are in line with economic theories 
and with empirical research findings of various researchers such as Mylonidis and Losifidi (2017), 
whose findings indicate that consumption taxes such as VAT or tax on products have a negative impact 
on income distribution.  The negative impact of consumption taxes can be attributed to several factors, 
of which the key factors are summarised below:  
 
Firstly, taxes on products have a negative impact on income distribution because they charge low-
income earners a large fraction of their income and high-income earners a small fraction of their income. 
This is because consumption taxes such as a tax on products are regressive; as a result, they negatively 
affect low-income earners severely as opposed to high-income earners. Secondly, when there is an 
increase in consumption taxes, retailers and businesses would pass on the tax burden to consumers by 
increasing the prices of goods and services on which the tax is levied. Because consumption taxes are 
regressive, people in the low-income category will be worse off as opposed to those in the high-income 
category.   These results are confirmed by the research conducted by Martinez-Vazquez, et al., (2012), 
whose findings indicate that consumption taxes have an unbalancing effect on income inequality.  
 
The research findings indicate that customs and excise duty have a worsening effect on the Gini 
coefficient, which is a similar trend in consumption taxes discussed earlier in this subsection. The 
coefficient of customs and excise duty is positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance 
level. The P-value of customs and excise duty is 0.0060 while its coefficient is 0.04439, which implies 
that an increase in customs and excise duty by 1 per cent will lead to an increase in income inequality 
(Gini coefficient) by 0.04 per cent, ceteris paribus. These results conform to economic theories and 
empirical findings, which suggest that consumption taxes are not effective in reducing income 
inequality. The findings of the research conducted by Mylonidis and Losifidi (2017) reveal that indirect 
taxes are not effective in reducing income inequality. Martinez-Vazquez, et al., (2012) also arrived at 
the same conclusion that consumption taxes such as excise taxes and customs duties have an 
unbalancing effect on income inequality.    
 
The empirical findings of this research indicate that corporate income tax/tax on corporations is 
statistically significant at 1 per cent and has a negative impact on income distribution with the P-value 
of 0.0001. These findings are in line with the findings of Leu, et al., (2009), whose research findings 
indicate that indirect taxes are regressive, contributing to an increase in inequality and poverty. The 
coefficient of corporate income tax is 0.1192, which implies that a 1 per cent increase in corporate 
income tax will lead to a 0.12 per cent increase in the Gini coefficient. This is in line with general 
economic theories and with the empirical research findings of various researchers such as Mylonidis 
and Losifidi (2017), whose research findings indicate that indirect taxes are not effective in reducing 
income inequality. Increasing corporate income tax has a worsening effect on income distribution 
because corporations and businesses pass on the increment in corporate tax to employees and consumers 
through low salaries, poor service benefits, and high prices of goods and services. This has a severe 
effect on employees in low-income group and ordinary citizens in the low-income category, thereby 
aggravating income inequality and poverty.  
 
The R-squared value is 0.733304, which implies that 73.33 per cent of the variation in the Gini 
coefficient is explained by the explanatory variables under investigation, namely, government 
expenditure on education, government expenditure on health, customs and excise duty from the SACU, 
tax on products, tax on income and wealth, government expenditure on social pensions, and corporate 
income tax. The remaining 26.67 per cent is explained by the error term. The Durbin-Watson statistic 
is 1.9973, which is very close to 2, and this is an indication that there is no autocorrelation. The F-
statistic is significant at 5 per cent, which shows that the estimated short-run ARDL model is robust.  
 
3.4 Granger causality and Diagnostic test results  
The study employed the Granger causality tests to assess the short-term causality between the Gini 
coefficient and the selected explanatory variables. The granger causality test rests are given in table 9 
below:  
 
Table 9: Granger causality test results 
Dependent 
variable 
SHORT-RUN GRANGER CAUSALITY 
Tests Conclusion 































D(LN_CIT) Causes D(LN_G) 
Source: Authors compilation from Eviews output 
 
The short-run Granger causality tests indicate that there is a statistically significant causal relationship 
between the Gini coefficient and five of the seven explanatory variables, namely, government 
expenditure on social pensions, government expenditure on education, tax on products, customs and 
excise duties from SACU and tax on income and wealth. The short-run Granger causality test results 
further indicate that government expenditure on health and tax on income and wealth does not have a 
significant causal relationship with the Gini coefficient. The Granger causality results using the two 
tests above are supporting each other which implies that the results obtained are valid and robust.  
 
Four diagnostic tests were conducted to assess the robustness of the estimated model. The robustness 
tests that were conducted are the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test, the ARCH test for 
heteroscedasticity, the Ramsey Regression Equation Specification Error Test (RESET) and the test 
Jarque-Bera normality test. Three of the four diagnostic tests reveal that the estimated model is robust. 
Table 10 below demonstrates the outcome of the diagnostic tests:   
 
Table 10: Diagnostic test results 
Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test 
F-statistic: 0.000130 Prob. F: 0.9999 
Obs*R-squared: 0.000315 Prob. Chi-Square: 0.9998 
ARCH test results for heteroscedasticity 
F-statistic: 0.893661 Prob. F: 0.3475 
Obs*R-squared: 0.906519 Prob. Chi-Square: 0.3410 
Ramsey RESET test 
t-statistics Prob.  0.5436 
F-statistic Prob. 0.5567 
Jarque-Bera Normality Test results 
Jarque-Bera: 729.3972 Prob. 0.0000 
Source: Authors compilation from Eviews output 
 
The Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test result indicates that there is no serial correlation and 
the ARCH test results for heteroscedasticity indicate that the residuals are homoscedastic. The Ramsey 
RESET test reveals that the model is correctly specified. The residuals are not normally distributed and 
this can be attributed to data extrapolation. Based on the test results of the majority of the tests, we can 




The research reveals that government expenditure on social pensions has a reducing effect on the Gini 
coefficient and that it is statistically significant at 1 per cent, which suggests that an increase in 
government expenditure on social pensions will lead to a reduction in the Gini coefficient, representing 
an improvement in income distribution. Given this relationship, the government should 
maintain/improve the current social pension scheme because of its contribution to a fair distribution of 
income. Government expenditure on education has an improvement or balancing effect on the Gini 
coefficient and it is statistically significant. This implies that an increase in government expenditure on 
education will lead to a reduction in income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. On that 
basis, the Namibian government should increase its expenditure on education; however, expenditure in 
the form of loans should be prioritised as opposed to grants and scholarships. Prioritising loans over 
grants and scholarships will ensure the sustainability of the NSFAF in the long run because the funds 
will be revolving. The tax on products, customs and excise duty from the SACU, and corporate income 
tax have an unbalancing effect on the Gini coefficient and that they are significant determinants of the 
Gini coefficient. An increase in any of the three taxes mentioned above will lead to an increase in 
income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. The research recommends a tax mix and tax 
discrimination where certain products are highly taxed, e.g. luxury products. With the tax mix, some 
taxes can be slightly reduced, e.g. corporate tax to attract investors, while other taxes should be 
increased, e.g. sin tax (tax on alcohol and tobacco) to increase government revenue and discourage 
destructive habits. A tax mix and a hybrid of taxation and government expenditure components are 
strongly recommended to achieve a balance. Corporate companies should also be charged differently 
depending on the industries they operate and the nature of their operations.  This should however be 
done with caution to ensure that the country remains competitive to foreign and local investors.  
  
4.1 Limitations of the research 
 
Considerable care was taken to ensure that this research is as acceptable and defensible as possible. 
However, a few challenges and limitations were experienced. The first limitation is the unavailability 
of national data for the years before independence. Data from 1990 and older is very limited or 
unavailable because there was no proper record due to the war in the country during that time. We 
should also take note that most of the institutions, e.g. Bank of Namibia and Namibia Statistics Agency, 
were established only after independence in 1990, which means that the records were unreliable or non-
existent. As a result, the researchers used data from 1996 – 2016. Due to limited data, data extrapolation 
was conducted by converting annual observations to quarterly observations in Eviews to be able to 
conduct a complete assessment.   The second limitation is that some explanatory variables were 
excluded because the data records available are very limited. Future studies can include some of the 
excluded variables such as transfer and stamp duties.   Further analysis might include a Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) approach that could also be used with a panel of data in terms of SACU 
or SADC for future studies. 
 
Despite these limitations and challenges that might affect the empirical findings of this research, it is 
assumed that these effects did not significantly affect the findings of the research. This assumption is 
backed by the fact that the results conform to theoretical and empirical literature and most diagnostic 
tests reveal that the estimated model is robust. On that basis, there is a very strong conviction that the 
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